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Abstract
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring and social ties within
group lending programs on moral hazard behavior of its participants, based on data from an
extensive questionnaire held in Eritrea among participants of 102 groups. We find support for the
fact that peer monitoring by and social ties of group leaders do help to reduce moral hazard
behavior of group members. In contrast, peer monitoring by and social ties of other group
members are not related to reducing the occurrence of moral hazard within groups.
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21. INTRODUCTION
In many developing economies the majority of the people live in great poverty. Usually,
the poor have no access to loans from the formal banking system, because they cannot put
up collateral that is accepted by these banks and because the costs for banks of screening
and monitoring the actions of the poor, and of enforcing their contracts are too high to
make lending to this group profitable for banks. The lack of having access to external
finance is one of the reasons why many people in developing economies remain stuck in
poverty. Recently, however, the poor in both rural and urban areas of these economies
have succeeded in gaining increased access to loans. An important contribution to make
this possible is made by so-called group lending programs. During the past few years,
these programs have been introduced in many developing economies.
The basic idea of these group lending programs is that loans are made to
individuals who is a member of a borrowing group; yet, all group members are
responsible for the repayment of the loan to the program. This creates incentives for
individual group members to screen and monitor the other members of the group and to
enforce repayment. Thus, the lender no longer has to invest in screening, monitoring and
enforcement activities; the group lending structure creates an effective way of screening,
monitoring and enforcement of contracts among borrowers. The group lending structure
creates its own kind of collateral, which in the literature is referred to as social collateral.
One of the expected outcomes of group lending programs is that it reduces moral hazard
behavior of the participants.
While this outcome can be shown in theoretical models (see, e.g., Stiglitz, 1990;
Varian, 1990), there has been surprisingly little empirical evidence on this issue. This is
related to the fact that it is difficult to obtain reliable data on the behavior of participants
in group lending programs. In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact
of peer monitoring and social ties within group lending programs on moral hazard
behavior of its participants, based on data from an extensive questionnaire held in Eritrea
among participants in two group lending programs. It is important to know whether group
3lending programs help to mitigate moral hazard behavior, since this may contribute to
higher repayment rates, which in turn may improve the sustainability of such programs.
The more sustainable these programs are, the more they can contribute to reducing credit
constraints of the poor.
One distinguishing feature of the Eritrean programs is the fact that the group
leader seems to play a prominent role in the functioning of the group. In our analysis we
specifically investigate whether this has consequences for the impact peer monitoring and
social ties may have on the occurrence of moral hazard behavior in the group.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review
of the literature on group lending programs and the related incentive effects on the
behavior of group participants, emphasizing moral hazard behavior. Section 3 discusses
the two group lending programs in Eritrea and section 4 describes the questionnaire we
have conducted and the resulting data set we have used in the empirical part of this paper.
Section 5 presents the empirical model we use to investigate moral hazard behavior in the
group lending programs in Eritrea. Section 6 discusses the outcomes of the empirical
analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2. GROUP LENDING AND MORAL HAZARD: A BRIEF LITERATURE
REVIEW
During the past 10 to 20 years micro finance programs as a mechanism to lend to the poor
have gained increasing interest from governments, non-government organizations
(NGOs) and donor committees, as well as from academic researchers. Such programs
have been introduced in many developing economies, and even in some developed
countries. At the end of 2001, over 2,000 so-called micro finance programs were
established, serving over 30 million people (Daley-Harris, 2002). Several of these
programs make use of group lending to provide credit to the poor.
The mechanism of group lending has received great attention, both among policy
makers as well as in the academic literature. The attention for these group-lending
4programs can be explained from the fact that they are seen by many as a panacea for
reducing poverty. Lack of access to credit is considered to be one of the major constraints
the poor are confronted with when they are planning to make (small) investments in order
to improve their income levels. Group lending may allow the poor to get access to credit,
thereby improving their income situation. The optimistic view on the possibilities of
group lending to reduce poverty is also stimulated by the apparent success of the
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh in reaching the poor and improving their income levels by
extending small group loans for investment.
The idea of group lending is simple. Participants in such programs are usually too
poor to get access to bank credit. The small size of the loans they need is not
commercially viable for banks. The costs of screening, monitoring and enforcing
repayments related to such loans are far higher than the returns on them. The standard
solution banks use to reduce such costs, i.e. requiring collateral, is not applicable in the
case of poor borrowers, since in almost all cases they have no acceptable and/or valuable
collateral. This makes lending to them a very risky business.
In group lending programs screening, monitoring and enforcing repayments
problems are solved by providing loans to an individual borrower, who is a member of a
borrowing group. The group of borrowers is made responsible for the repayment of the
loan: all group members are jointly liable. Non-repayment by the group also means that
all borrowers in the group will be denied future access to loans from the program. The
principle of joint-liability creates an incentive mechanism in which each group member
has an interest in screening and monitoring the other members, and to enforce repayment
if necessary, since the non-repayment of one of the other members will be costly for
her/him and, additionally, may cut off access to loans in the future. Thus, individual
borrowers are stimulated to select credible members to group with, to monitor the other
members’ activities once the loan is received, and to enforce repayment in case a group
member fails to pay her/his obligations. Joint-liability creates its own kind of collateral to
reduce such costs. This is referred to as social collateral in the literature. Joint-liability,
5therefore, reduces the costs of screening, monitoring and enforcement of repayments for
the creditor.
Several theoretical papers have shown the positive contribution of joint-liability
programs to reducing screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. Some models focus
on group lending and its effects on monitoring and moral hazard behavior of borrowers.
Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990) are the seminal publications in this area. They present
models in which peer monitoring within groups reduces moral hazard behavior of
individual group members. Group lending programs delegate costly monitoring activities
to group members, reducing the costs of lending, which may be translated into lower
interest rates the borrowers have to pay (Varian, 1990) and/or larger loan contracts
(Stiglitz, 1990). Banerjee et al. (1994) discuss the credit cooperatives that were common
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western Europe. They show that
these credit cooperatives created incentive structures similar to the group lending
programs, leading to monitoring among borrowers, which helped to reduce moral hazard
behavior.
Other models elaborate on the Stiglitz-Varian models, dealing with extensions
such as the efficient organization of monitoring within groups (Armendariz de Aghion,
1999) and the importance of repeated loan contracts in order to obtain the benefits from
peer monitoring and to prevent free rider problems from occurring within groups (Che,
2001). Still other models relax the assumption of costless peer monitoring implicit in the
Stigliz-Varian models (Conning, 2000; Madajewicz, 1999). Conning (1996) presents a
model in which it is shown that group lending will only be used if group members have
substantial monitoring and enforcement advantage as compared to outsiders, and if the
project returns across borrowers are not highly correlated. The model also discusses the
effects collusion among borrowers on group lending efficiency and provides a cost-
benefit analysis of group lending.
Some papers focus on the role of social ties between group members in reducing
moral hazard behavior by individual members. The importance of social ties is explained
6in terms of the consequences of non-repayment of one member for her or his position
within an existing social network, since non-repayment will have a negative impact on
the other group members’ current wealth and future access to loans. Strong social ties
may help the process of peer monitoring and peer pressure. It is believed that due to these
ties members may have better information to monitor and may more easily pressure for
repayment (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991). Others, however, have indicated that social
networks may be counterproductive. Since people know each other very well and have
close social ties, they may be less eager to pressure for repayment (Wydick, 1999). For
instance, family or friends may be less eager to use pressure for fear of losing family or
friends, which in such cases is valued higher than losing money (Conning, 2000).
Finally, some papers stress the importance of using peer pressure to force
repayment within groups and reduce moral hazard (Besley and Coate, 1995). A related
argument holds that once sufficiently strong and credible threats of the use of social
pressure exist, this may stimulate individuals not to pursue moral hazard behavior
(Wydick, 1996).
Wydick (2001) presents a model in which several of the abovementioned issues
related to the working of group lending are combined. In this model, groups are created
based on self-selection but (in contrast with other models) under imperfect information.
Next, monitoring takes place, and members help those who have been confronted with
adverse external shocks and exclude those who have misused the money they have
received by using social sanctions. In the model of Wydick, borrowing groups are
described as dynamic peer review committees.
Whereas the theoretical literature on monitoring and moral hazard within group
lending programs is quite extensive, there are only very few empirical studies of these
phenomena. One possible explanation for this is that it is difficult to obtain reliable data
on monitoring and moral hazard behavior of participants in group lending programs. The
only substantial empirical study available is carried out by Wydick (1999), who uses
information from group lending programs in Guatemala. Wydick analyses the role of peer
7monitoring, peer pressure and social ties within these groups in reducing moral hazard
behavior of individual group members. His findings show that while peer monitoring and
(to a lesser extent) peer pressure help to reduce moral hazard and increase the repayment
performance of groups, social ties do not have such effects.1
3. A DESCRIPTION OF GROUP LENDING IN ERITREA
Currently, two group lending programs are operating in Eritrea. The Saving and Micro
Credit program (SMCP) is active since 1996 and is part of the Eritrean Community
Development Fund (ECDF), a government related fund. The funding for this program
comes from the Eritrean government, the World Bank and from grants from a number of
individual donor countries. The Southern Zone Saving and Credit Scheme (SZSCS)
started in 1994 and was launched by the Agency for Co-operation and Research in
Development (ACORD), a British NGO. SMCP has its activities all over the country,
whereas SZSCS concentrates its efforts in the southern part of Eritrea. Both programs are
active in rural as well as in urban areas. The borrowers in both programs are active as
retailers, farmers, or small-scale producers.
 Both programs are set up along the lines of the Grameen Bank model. Groups are
formed through self-selection. After a group is accepted by one of the two programs,
members are required to go through a short training program. Moreover, the group has to
select a group leader and (sometimes) a group secretary. The role of the group secretary is
to keep the accounts of the group. The group leader is the intermediary between the group
and the program staff (i.e. the program’s credit officer and/or the village credit committee
or bank). He/she has to regularly report to the program’s staff on the performance and
sustainability of the group. Moreover, he/she has to chair group meetings, collect the
install payments from group members and transfer them to the credit officer, visit group
members regularly and discusses business and/or group related problems, and call for
extra group meetings if repayment problems occur. Being a group leader is a voluntary
activity; it does not generate any (financial) remuneration. From the above description it
8appears that a group leader may have quite an important role to play as a representative of
the group to the program organization and may generate all kinds of activities that may
help improve repayment performance of the group he/she represent.
SMCP works through village banks that administer the provision of loans to so-
called solidarity groups at the village level. By the end of 2002 the program had
established 162 village banks and had almost 14,000 members. This amount has
increased quite substantially over the last four years: in 1998 the program had only 6,000
members. Groups in SMCP consist of 3-7 members. Group members may not have
family ties. Individuals are only allowed to borrow after they have accumulated
mandatory savings equal to 10 per cent of the sum they want to borrow in the previous
three months. The village banks typically provide loans to between 35-105 individuals.
The size of the loans ranges between USD70 – USD710.2 All members of a group are
individually liable for repayment of the loan made to the group. Main aim of the use of
group lending is that due to the joint liability element, group members may have an
incentive to monitor each other and, if necessary, may use pressure to force those
members who fail or are unwilling to make repayments on time. Repayments are made on
a monthly basis. In October 1999 the program had 6,223 beneficiaries with USD1.4
million of outstanding loans. The repayment rate was 98 per cent (September 1999)
(Seltene, 1999).
The organizational structure of SZSCS is slightly different from that of SMCP.
SZSCS works through so-called credit and savings committees (CSCs) consisting of
representatives of solidarity groups based within the villages. These committees evaluate
loan requests from groups and forward them to the program management. Based on the
information obtained from the CSCs the program management decides whether or not to
give a loan to a group. By 1999 the program had reached 192 villages. Groups in SZSCS
consist of 3-7 members. The size of the loans ranges between USD70 – USD570. Initial
loans to an individual may be no higher than USD150. Individuals are only allowed to
borrow after they have accumulated mandatory savings equal to five per cent of the sum
9they want to borrow. For repeat loans the savings requirement may go up to a maximum
of 15 per cent of the borrowed sum. Loans are extended for a large range of activities,
such as small-scale trading, dairy production, purchase of oxen, irrigated horticulture and
other agricultural activities. Some 80 per cent of the borrowers live in rural areas. As in
SMCP, in SZSCS all members of a group are individually liable for repayment of the
loan made to the group and repayments have to be made on a monthly basis. In 2001 the
program had a portfolio of 6,250 loans. The repayment rate was 98 per cent.3
4. DATA DESCRIPTION
During 2000 we conducted a survey among 102 groups, of which 56 were in SMCP and
46 were in SZSCS. Most of these groups were based in small villages and secondary
towns of Eritrea. In the survey we asked questions about the socio-economic
characteristics of the group members, as well as about the saving and repayment
performance of individual group members. In addition, we included questions on the
group formation process, the existence of social ties, and on processes of screening,
monitoring and enforcement within groups. From each group we selected the group
leader and one or more other members to answer the questions. Part of the questions was
submitted to both the group leader and the other member(s) of each group; another part of
the questions was specifically asked to the group leader. We included separate questions
for the group leader, since, as was described in section 3, these group leaders appear to
have a quite important role to play as a representative of the group to the programme
organisation; in our analysis we specifically investigate whether this has consequences
for the impact peer monitoring and social ties may have on the occurrence of moral
hazard behavior in the group.
Through the questionnaire we obtained information from 351 group members, of
whom 102 were group leaders. Of the total sample of group members, 167 were
participating in the SZSCS program and 184 in the SMCP program. Within the sample,
196 borrowers were females (56 per cent) and 155 were males. The majority (68 per cent)
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of the respondents had no or only primary education. The average monthly income of
group members was approximately USD75. Trade (63 per cent) and farming (17 per cent)
were the main occupations of group members; many of them usually had two (or more)
occupations at the same time.
On average groups were composed of 4.5 members, with a median of 4, ranging
from a minimum of three to a maximum of seven members. The amount of loan cycles
(or loan rounds) groups had completed up to the interview ranged from a minimum of
two to a maximum of seven with an average of 3.6 cycles. Group savings were
approximately USD155, ranging from just USD20 to USD500. Group loans ranged from
USD54 to USD607 with mean and median loan size of USD282 and USD250,
respectively. Loan terms varied from three to 24 months. Group members mainly used
the loans for working capital purposes. In some cases, the money was used to buy
livestock and raw materials. Only 18 respondents reported they had other sources of
credit, such as banks (5), money lenders (2) and relatives (6), next to the loan from the
group lending program. Most respondents (337) had never even applied for a bank loan.
Of the total sample, 17 per cent of the group members responded they have had
repayment problems in the past at least once.
As mentioned, the focus of this paper is on moral hazard behavior and the role of
peer monitoring within groups in reducing such behavior. In order to investigate this, we
need a measure of moral hazard behavior within groups. Following the empirical work by
Wydick (1999) we included a question on the instances of misuse of borrowed money by
group members. In order to get a clear picture of such instances, we decided to ask the
question to only one person in a group to avoid getting conflicting information on this
issue. We concluded that the best person to ask this question is the group leader, since
he/she is responsible to report about the performance and sustainability of the group to
the program staff and he/she has several other responsibilities within the group that make
him/her the most reliable source for information about loan abuses. Since we have 102
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group leaders in our sample we also have the same amount of observations on the
instances of misuse of borrowed money.
Of the 102 group leaders, 46 were in a group in the SZSCS program and 56 in a
group of the SMCP program; 54 of them were males (53 per cent) and 48 were females.
Group leaders income was similar (USD72) to the average income level of all group
members in the sample. They were also very similar to the average group member in
terms of occupation: 61 per cent of them were active in trade, whereas 15 per cent were
active in farming.
5. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
As pointed out in the literature review, monitoring and social ties may affect the
occurrence of moral hazard within groups. In the empirical analysis we investigate
whether peer monitoring and social ties play a role in mitigating moral hazard problems
in the context of the two Eritrean group lending programs.
The dependent variable in the analysis is ABUSES, a dummy variable that may be
0 or 1, and which measures the occurrence of moral hazard behavior within a group. In
particular, ABUSES = 1 if the group leader indicates that at least one member has ever
misused a loan. We use a logit model to estimate the effects of a number of independent
variables measuring social ties and peer monitoring within groups in reducing moral
hazard behavior of group members. In our data set we have information on these
variables; the available information allows us to distinguish between group leaders and
other group members with respect to their opportunities for monitoring and the existence
of social ties they may have with the other members of the group.
From the survey we were able to use a number of (dummy) variables to measure
whether monitoring may take place within groups. In particular, we have used the
following variables to measure monitoring:
- KNACTDUM = 1 if the group member knows the activities of the other group
members;
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- KNSELDUM = 1 if the group member knows the monthly sales of the other group
members;
- DISTANCE = average distance (in meters) between the group member and the other
members of the group;
- VISITDUM = 1 if the group member regularly visits the other group members.
These four variables hold information about the extent to which group members (group
leaders or other members) hold information about each other, giving them the opportunity
to monitor each other. For KNACTDUM, KNSELDUM and VISIT we expect a negative
sign of the coefficient: if these dummies are equal to 1, the probability of moral hazard
occurring in a group falls: if group members know about each others sales and activities
and if they visit each other regularly, they will also be better equipped to monitor each
others behavior. For DISTANCE we expect a positive sign of the coefficient: if the
distance between group members increases monitoring becomes more difficult and thus
the probability of moral hazard increases.
Next, we have a number of dummy variables to measure the existence of social
ties. In particular, we have used the following variables:
- BOGROUP = 1 if the group member is born in the same area where the survey was
held;
- KNMEDUM = 1 if the group member knows the other group members before
forming the group;
- CHGRDUM = 1 if the group member has ever been member of another group.
All three variables hold information about the extent to which individuals within a group
are related to each other. Such relations may influence the use of peer monitoring and/or
peer pressure within the group. For BOGROUP and KNMEDUM we expect a negative
sign of the coefficient: if these dummies are equal to 1, this means that group members
know each other, which is assumed to indicate the existence of social ties, leading the
probability of moral hazard occurring in a group to fall. For CHGRDUM we expect a
positive sign of the coefficient: if this dummy is equal to 1, the probability of moral
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hazard occurring in a group increases, since the switching between groups is assumed to
reduce social ties and the knowledge the group member will have of the other group
members.
Next to these variables measuring social ties and peer monitoring within groups,
we also use a number of variables measuring personal characteristics of group members
and a number of other variables. These two sets of variables are used in the empirical
analysis as control variables. In particular, we have used the following variables to
measure personal characteristics (again, we have information on these variables for group
leaders and other group members separately):
- AGE = age of the group member (years);
- GENDUM = 1 if the group member is a male;
- EDUCATION indicates the educational background of the group member, ranging
from 1 (= illiterate) to 4 (= secondary schooling);
- MOSDUM = 1 if the group member is a Moslem;
- MARDUM = 1 if the group member is married;
- INCOME = monthly income of the group member (in Nakfas)
The reason why we include these variables in our analysis is that personal characteristics
might influence moral hazard behavior in groups. We have no explicit expectations on the
signs of each of the variables, however.
Finally, we use the following set of other control variables:
- PROVISIT = 1 if a representative of the credit program regularly visits the group;
- GAGREEDUM = 1 if the group members use informal rules on how to behave
within the group;
- VFACCESS indicates the value a group member attaches to having access to loans
from the credit program in the future, ranging from 1 (= very high value) to 4 (=
very low value)
- SAMESEX = 1 if all group members are of the same sex;
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- LEADERRESP = 1 if the other group members agree with the statement that their
group leader shows high responsibility.
The variables PROVISIT, GAGREEDUM and SAMESEX refer to the group as a whole
(i.e. including the group leader and the other group members). For PROVISIT and
GAGREEDUM we expect to find a negative sign: if a representative regularly visits the
group and if groups use informal rules this will reduce the probability of moral hazard
behavior. For VFACCESS we also expect to find a negative sign: if group members attach
a high value to future access to loans from the program, this will encourage them to be
behave prudently, thus reducing the probability of moral hazard behavior occurring. The
LEADERRESP variable refers to the other group members only. We have no explicit
expectations on the signs of this variable and of the SAMESEX variable.
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As was indicated above, the empirical analysis focuses on testing whether peer
monitoring and the existence of social ties in groups do play a role in mitigating misuse
of loans by group members. The analysis is carried out as follows. We start by estimating
the complete model, which includes all our measures of peer monitoring, social ties,
individual characteristics and other variables as discussed in section 5. Next, we delete
variables from the model for which we do not find significant coefficients until we find
the best fitting model, i.e. the model including only significant coefficients. In this way,
we are able to test for the robustness of the variables for which we do find significant
coefficients.
We test the model for two types of group members, i.e. group leaders and other
group members. This approach is inspired by the fact that in the Eritrean programs the
group leader seems to play a prominent role in the functioning of the group. In our
analysis we specifically investigate whether this distinguishing feature has consequences
for the impact peer monitoring and social ties have on the occurrence of moral hazard
behavior in a group. We have 102 observations to estimate the model. For the model
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focusing on the group leaders we use the information from the questionnaire provided by
102 group leaders. For the model focusing on the other group members (249
observations) we use the averages of variables of the other group members of each of the
102 groups.
Tables 1a and 1b provide descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the
empirical investigation for both the group leaders and the other group members. The
Tables show that the statistics for most of the variables included in the empirical model
do not differ much when comparing group leaders with the other group members. The
only significant differences appear to be with respect to INCOME, EDUCATION and
DISTANCE. Group leaders appear to have a higher income, they are somewhat higher
educated and the distance between them and the other group members is higher as
compared to the averages of these three variables of the other group members. Moreover,
it appears that among group leaders men are more dominant than among the other group
members (GENDUM).
<INSERT TABLES 1a AND 1b HERE>
Table 2 provides the results of the empirical analysis. In the table Z-statistics are
given in parentheses. Equation 2-1 in the Table shows the results of the complete model
using information for the other group members. Interestingly, none of the peer
monitoring and social ties variables and most of the other variables have a statistically
significant coefficient, indicating that peer monitoring and social ties of other group
members do not play a role in mitigating misuse of loans by group members.
Yet, if we concentrate on the group leaders only, then we find support for the fact
that peer monitoring by and social ties of group leaders do play a role in mitigating moral
hazard problems within groups (equations 2-2 to 2-5). In particular, the Table shows that
in the complete model (equation 2-2) we find statistically significant coefficients for two
of the four peer monitoring variables (DISTANCE and VISITDUM) and two of the three
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social ties variables (KNMEDUM and CHGRDUM). All four variables have the expected
sign. Of the control variables we find statistically significant coefficients for INCOME,
VFACCESS and SAMESEX.
With respect to peer monitoring the results suggest that if the group leader
regularly visits the other group members, the probability of moral hazard occurring is
reduced. Moreover, if the distance between the group leader and the other members
increases, the probability of moral hazard occurring increases. With respect to social ties,
the results show that if the group leader knows the other group members before forming
the group, this reduces the probability of moral hazard occurring. Moreover, if the group
leader has been member of at least one other group in the past, this increases the
probability of moral hazard occurring, since switching between groups is assumed to
reduce social ties and the knowledge the group leader will have of the other group
members.
The results for the importance of peer monitoring and social ties of the group
leader seem to be robust. The coefficients for DISTANCE, VISITDUM, KNMEDUM and
CHGRDUM remain to be statistically significant and keep having the right sign, even
after three consecutive rounds of deleting variables; in the first two rounds we delete
those variables for which the Z-statistic of the coefficient is less than one (equations 2-3
and 2-4), in the last round we delete all variables that remain to be statistically
insignificant, i.e. having a Z-statistic of less than 1.64 (equation 2-5). Moreover, the value
of the coefficients of three of the four variables remains relatively stable,4 again
suggesting that the results we have found are robust.
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>
The results presented in Table 2 lend support to the hypothesis that, since the group
leader in the Eritrean programs does seem to play a prominent role in the functioning of
the group, this has consequences for the impact of peer monitoring by and social ties of
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the group leader vis-à-vis monitoring and social ties of other group members on the
probability of moral hazard occurring in the group. Peer monitoring and social ties of
other group members does not seem to have such consequences.
The results may have either one of the two following interpretations.5 First, they
may indicate that only group leaders really do monitor and have social ties, which then
have a mitigating effect on moral hazard behavior among group members. This means
that for instance in the case of the peer monitoring variable VISITDUM if the group
leader visits the other group members this leads to peer monitoring, whereas if other
group members visit other members this does not lead to peer monitoring. Similar
interpretations hold for the other peer monitoring and social ties variables. Put differently,
in case of the group leaders the monitoring and social ties variables really do measure
peer monitoring activities and social ties, whereas in case of the other group members
they do not. This may be true if group members free ride on the efforts made by their
group leader to reduce the occurrence of moral hazard. As described in section 3, in the
Erirtrean programs a group leader has quite an important role to play as a representative
of the group to the program organization and he/she may generate all kinds of activities
that may help improve repayment performance of the group he/she represents. This may
leave little incentives for other group members to put much effort into monitoring of
group members, especially since these efforts may be costly and time consuming.
Alternatively, the results may indicate that monitoring and social ties of group
leaders is efficient in reducing moral hazard behavior, whereas monitoring and social ties
of other group members is not. Thus, for instance in the case of VISITDUM, if the group
leader visits other group members and this leads to monitoring activities this reduces the
probability of moral hazard occurring, whereas if other group members visit other
members and this leads to monitoring this does not reduce the probability of moral hazard
occurring. Apparently, group members only feel pressured to behave prudently when the
group leader monitors, perhaps because he/she may have more means to sanction moral
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hazard behavior by group members due to his/her role as the representative of the group
to the program organization.
One important issue that remains to be clarified is the question why an individual
would be willing to become the group leader, given the fact that this position may be
quite burdensome and responsible, it does not generate any (financial) remuneration, and
that other group members may try to free ride on the monitoring efforts of the group
leader? Again, there may be two alternative interpretations for this. First, individuals may
attach a high value to becoming a group leader, although it does not generate a formal
reward. Being a group leader and carrying out the responsible task of representing the
group to the program organization generates a stock of (non-financial) obligations of the
other group members to the group leader, which he/she may claim at a later date
(Warning and Sadoulet, 1998). Thus, if an individual takes up the task of group leader,
he/she may be compensated by future support from one or more other group members in
constructing his/her house or in harvesting his/her crops. In a rural society with
underdeveloped markets and institutions such non-financial obligations may play an
important role in the survival strategy of individuals.
Alternatively, the results of our empirical analysis may also give at least a partial
answer to the question why individuals seem to be willing to become group leader. One
of the control variables, VFACCESS, indicates the value a group member attaches to
having access to loans from the credit program in the future; a higher value for this
variable indicates that an individual attaches a lower value to having loans from the
program in the future. This variable appears to be insignificant in the estimations for the
other group members (equation 2-1); yet, it is significant and it has a positive sign in the
estimations for the group leaders (equation 2-2 to 2-5). So, it appears that if group leaders
attach a high value to having future access to loans from the programme, this reduces the
probability of moral hazard occurring. This relationship does not exist for the other group
members. Our interpretation of this result is that group leaders may be those individuals
who have the strongest incentives to repay the current loans, because they, more than the
19
other group members, want to have future access through the program. This in turn may
give them incentives to take the lead in making the group in which they participate repay
the current loan.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated whether peer monitoring and social ties reduce the occurrence
of moral hazard in the setting of two group lending programs in Eritrea. More
specifically, in our analysis we have looked at peer monitoring and social ties of two
types of group members: the group leader and the other group members. We find support
for the fact that peer monitoring by and social ties of the group leader may help to reduce
moral hazard behavior of group members. In particular, our results indicate that regular
contact and short distance between the group leader and the other group members helps to
reduce misuse of loans by individual group members. Moreover, if the group leader
knows the other group members before forming the group and if he/she did not change
group in the past this reduces the probability of moral hazard from occurring in the group.
We find no link between peer monitoring and social ties on the one hand and the
occurrence of moral hazard on the other hand if we use data for the other group members.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to investigate the different
impact of monitoring efforts and social ties of different types of group members.
The analysis in this paper could be extended in a number of ways. First of all, we
need to elaborate on the theoretical foundation explaining why an individual would be
willing to become the group leader, given the fact that this position may be quite
burdensome and responsible and that other group members may try to free ride on the
monitoring efforts of the group leader. Second, and closely related to this, further
research is needed on how group leaders in Eritrean credit programs are chosen and why
individuals may be willing to take up the burdensome tasks of a group leader. Third, we
need to investigate whether the difference in the impact of peer monitoring by and social
ties of group leaders vis-à-vis other group members on the probability of moral hazard
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occurring in groups is also found elsewhere, i.e. in group lending programs outside
Eritrea.
Finally, further analysis is needed to find out whether the structure of group
lending in Eritrea, in which group leaders do seem to contribute most to the reduction of
the probability of moral hazard occurring, is effective in terms of improving repayment
performance of groups. On the one hand, this structure seems to put much emphasis on
the role of only one individual, i.e. the group leader, while the rest of the group members
is free riding on his/her efforts. This may not be informationally efficient. On the other
hand, although the literature explaining monitoring within groups normally assumes that
everybody is monitoring everybody else, some papers have pointed out that this may also
not be informationally efficient, since the costs of monitoring become too high in such a
model. These papers have suggested other group structures to carry out monitoring (see,
e.g., Armendariz de Aghion, 1999). The group structure that seems to work in the
Eritrean group lending programs may be just one of such alternatives; it remains to be
seen whether this structure is a good alternative (in terms of repayment performance) for
the ‘standard’ model of monitoring described in most of the literature.
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis,
Group Leaders
Group Leaders
Mean Median Max Min Std Dev
ABUSES* 0.23 0 1 0 0.42
KNACTDUM 0.90 1 1 0 0.30
KNSELDUM 0.04 0 1 0 0.20
DISTANCE 630.1 325 5,000 5 1,056.4
VISITDUM 0.71 1 1 0 0.46
BOGROUP 0.55 1 1 0 0.50
KNMEDUM 0.84 1 1 0 0.37
CHGRDUM 0.09 0 1 0 0.29
AGE 45.5 44.5 75 22 11.75
GENDUM 0.53 1 1 0 0.50
EDUCATION 2.2 2 4 1 0.87
MOSDUM 0.25 0 1 0 0.44
MARDUM 0.80 1 1 0 0.40
INCOME 1,108.8 1,000 2,000 600 385.1
PROVISIT* 0.84 1 1 0 0.37
GAGREEDUM* 0.28 0 1 0 0.45
VFACCESS 1.26 1 4 1 0.56
SAMESEX* 0.58 1 1 0 0.50
LEADERRESP** – – – – –
Notes:
* These variables refer to the group as a whole (i.e. including both the group leader and the other
group members). Therefore, the figures in the table are similar for both group leaders and other
group members.
** This variable is only relevant for the other group members; the question related to this variable
was only asked to the other group members.
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Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis,
Other Group Members
Other group members
Mean Median Max Min Std Dev
ABUSES* 0.23 0 1 0 0.42
KNACTDUM 0.90 1 1 0 0.21
KNSELDUM 0.05 0 1 0 0.18
DISTANCE 377.1 240 2,766.7 5 444.4
VISITDUM 0.77 1 1 0 0.34
BOGROUP 0.54 0.5 1 0 0.43
KNMEDUM 0.82 1 1 0 0.30
CHGRDUM 0.10 0 1 0 0.22
AGE 46.5 47.5 68.5 22 9.11
GENDUM 0.45 0.33 1 0 0.43
EDUCATION 1.8 2 3 1 0.61
MOSDUM 0.28 0 1 0 0.43
MARDUM 0.80 1 1 0 0.32
INCOME 957.6 900 7,250 350 697.7
PROVISIT* 0.84 1 1 0 0.37
GAGREEDUM* 0.28 0 1 0 0.45
VFACCESS 1.44 1.33 5 1 0.60
SAMESEX* 0.58 1 1 0 0.50
LEADERRESP** 1.53 1.5 3 1 0.45
Notes:
* These variables refer to the group as a whole (i.e. including both the group leader and the other
group members). Therefore, the figures in the table are similar for both group leaders and other
group members.
** This variable is only relevant for the other group members; the question related to this variable
was only asked to the other group members.
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Table 2: Results of the Logit Estimation of Determinants of Misuse of Loans
by Group Members



























































































































































Number of observations 102 102 102 102 102
Observations with dependent =
0
79 79 79 79 79
Probability (LR statistic) 0.752 0.003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Note: Z-statistics are given between parentheses.
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1 A few other studies have looked at monitoring and moral hazard, but they generally lack rigorous
econometric analyses. Mondal and Tune (1993) use information from the Good Faith Fund in the
United States. They describe that weak social ties lead to adverse repayment performance, since
group borrowers are not willing to support other group members in case of default. Van Tassel
(2000) provides a descriptive analysis of the group lending programme run by the BancoSol in La
Paz, Bolivia. The questionnaire he used for his research contained a question asking whether
individual group members gave business advice to other group members. 75 per cent of the
interviewed borrowers responded to this question affirmatively. Van Tassel argues that this is
indicative evidence for the fact monitoring takes place within groups.
2 We converted all data on income, loan size, etc, which in the original data set are given in Nakfa,
the official currency of Eritrea, into US dollars (USD) using an exchange rate of USD1 = 14
Nakfas. This was the official exchange rate at the time the data for this research were gathered.
3 All data on SZSCS are obtained from the ACORD website, and in particular from the page
providing information on SZSCS: www.acord.org.uk/h-ert4.htm (consulted on 6 February 2003).
4 Only the coefficient for CHGRDUM drops significantly, from 2.34 in equation 2-2 to 1.34 in
equation 2-5.
5 Unfortunately, our analysis does not allow us to decide which of the two interpretations is most
likely to hold in practice. Future research should address this question.
